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Abstract
This paper studies the extension of Harsanyi’s theorem (Harsanyi, 1955) in a frame-
work involving uncertainty. It seeks to extend the aggregation result to a wide
class of Monotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio et
al., 2011) that subsumes many models of choice under uncertainty proposed in
the literature. An impossibility result is obtained, unless we are in the specific
framework where all individuals and the decision-maker are subjective expected
utility maximizers sharing the same beliefs. This implies that non-expected utility
preferences cannot be aggregated consistently.
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1 Introduction
Harsanyi (1955) proved the following theorem: if (i) all individuals and the social
observer are expected utility maximizers on the set of simple lotteries over a set Y ;
(ii) whenever all individuals prefer lottery p to lottery q, the social observer must also
prefer p to q (the Pareto principle); then the social observer’s utility function must be
an affine combination of individuals’ von Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions.
This result is known as Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem.
The purpose of this note is to take up the issue considered by Harsanyi, namely
the aggregation of preferences, but when uncertainty rather than risk prevails. In that
context, the basic model is Subjective Expected Utility (henceforth SEU, see Savage,
1954), which captures beliefs through a probability distribution. But this model has
been challenged, in particular because the Sure-Thing Principle (holding that outcomes
which occur regardless of which action is chosen should not affect one’s preferences) is
often violated by individual decision makers.
In this note, we considerably widen the investigation by considering a large class
of preferences, namely Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean preferences (henceforth
MBA preferences, see Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011). This model permits a separation
between tastes and ambiguous beliefs (represented by a set of probability distributions),
in a specific sense. It also encompasses many models of decision under uncertainty
that have been proposed recently, in particular the Choquet expected utility model by
Schmeidler (1989), the multiple-prior preferences by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the
variational preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) and the second
order expected utility model by Klibanoff, Marinacci and, Mukerji (2005) and Ergin
and Gul (2009).
Our main result is that agents’ MBA preferences can be aggregated into MBA social
preferences only in the very specific case where all individuals and the society have SEU
preferences and share the same beliefs. In that case, it is also shown that the social
aggregation rule is very specific, namely the social SEU is an affine combination of the
agents SEU. Hence a consistent social aggregation of preferences is impossible as soon
as at least one of the following is true: (i) agents have different beliefs; (ii) agents have
non-SEU preferences.
It is already known that in models of decision under uncertainty it may not be
possible to aggregate beliefs and tastes in a consistent way. Hylland and Zeckhauser
1
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(1979) and Mongin (1995, 1998) showed that for SEU preferences: when individuals
are simultaneously heterogeneous in terms of tastes and beliefs, it is impossible to
aggregate individual preferences into an SEU social preference. A key issue is “spurious
unanimity”: opposite beliefs and tastes may induce people to agree that a decision is
better for conflicting reasons.
In the case of ambiguous beliefs, few results on preference aggregation exist in the
literature. Chambers and Hayashi (2006) considered a Savage framework, where deci-
sion makers may have non-SEU preferences. They showed that, when individuals have
different beliefs, eventwise monotonicity is incompatible with the Pareto axiom. Our
setting further weaken eventwise dominance to statewise dominance (monotonicity).
Yet, we are able to obtain an impossibility similar to the one they describe even when
people have the same beliefs.
Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud (2008) showed that, within the class of “Rank-Depen-
dent Additive”preferences, a consistent aggregation is impossible, even if all individuals
have the same beliefs, unless the society and the individual are uncertainty neutral
(which occurs in the SEU model). However, their aggregation result is obtained for a
smaller class of preferences than the one studied in this note.
The paper closest to ours is Mongin and Pivato (2015), which was written indepen-
dently of the present note. Their conclusion, like ours, is that consistent aggregations of
preferences can be achieved only if (i) the individuals and the observer are all SEU max-
imizers, and (ii) they use the same subjective probabilities. Technically, their method
of proof is similar to ours. It is based on the key insight provided by Blackorby, Don-
aldson and Mongin (2004) that the Pareto principle and monotonicity (or statewise
dominance) impose separability conditions. Combining these separability conditions
yield an additive separable representation. Their paper has a more general framework
than the one in this note: it encompasses other frameworks than choice under uncer-
tainty. But they also assume technical structural conditions (that the set of feasible
alternative is connected, sectionally connected, and indifference connected for the social
ordering). In the Anscombe-Aumann framework (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963), we
do not need such structural assumptions, but only standard and easily interpretable
choice-theoretic premisses.1
1In different but related settings, Blackorby, Donaldson and Mongin (2004) and Chambers and
Hayashi (2014) use the same ideas to derive additive representations, but they need to assume that the
2
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.69
Recently, Herzberg (2013) also obtained an impossibility result for the class of MBA
preferences we consider in this note. But he does so within an Arrovian aggregation
framework, using an aggregator desideratum of systematicity. In this note, we do not
impose such regularity constraints on the social aggregator.
Other papers are related to this note. Fleurbaey (2009) studied the aggregation
of expected utility individual preferences into a non-expected utility social preference
ordering, which satisfies statewise dominance. He obtained that the social aggrega-
tion must be affine so that society must use an expected utility to evaluate prospects.
We also find this affine aggregation when individuals’ preferences are SEU. This note
broadens the investigation to non SEU individual preferences and does not assume ob-
jective probabilities. Our proof is nonetheless related to his, for it relies on functional
equations.
More generally, there is a strand of the literature studying the consistency of ex ante
and ex post social judgements. Most of the literature has focused on the expected util-
ity case, to show that the Utilitarian rule is the only one that can be used consistently
ex ante and ex post (see in particular Hammond, 1981; Myerson, 1981; Blackorby, Don-
aldson and Weymark, 1999). The present note also seeks consistent social judgements,
but enlarges the study to non-expected utility preferences. It shows that not only the
social aggregation rule matters, but also the kind of preferences that are aggregated.
Specifically, we show that only SEU preferences with common beliefs can be aggregated
consistently.
The remainder of the note is divided into three sections and one appendix. In
Section 2, we lay down the model and define MBA preferences. In Section 3, we
present the result concerning the possibility of consistent aggregation of preferences
(Theorem 1). In Section 4, we discuss this result and several directions that can be
explored to go beyond it. An appendix provides the proof of Theorem 1.
2 The framework
Consider a society made of a finite number of agents N = {1, · · · , N}. Let N0 =
{0, 1, · · · , N} where 0 refers to society.
set of alternatives is a a product space. This is less general than Mongin and Pivato (2015) and the
present note.
3
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Uncertainty is modeled using the Anscombe-Aumann framework (Anscombe and
Aumann, 1963). There is a finite set S = {1, · · · , S} of states of the world. Let C be a
non-empty set of consequences and X = ∆(C) be the set of simple lotteries over C (that
is lotteries with finite support). Let A be the set of acts, that is, mappings f : S → X.
Since X is a mixture space, the mixture operation αx+ (1− α)y is well-defined for all
α ∈ [0, 1] and x, y ∈ X, and αx+ (1− α)y ∈ X. We will identify X with the subset of
sure acts, that is acts x ∈ A such that x(s) = x for all s ∈ S, where x ∈ X. One can also
define a mixture operation on A in the following way: for any f, g ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1],
the act αf + (1− α)g in A is such that (αf + (1− α)g)(s) = αf(s) + (1− α)g(s) ∈ X
for every state s ∈ S.
We model the preferences of an agent i ∈ N on A by a binary relation %i, and
denote by i and ∼i its symmetric and asymmetric components. Society’s preferences
are denoted %0, with similar definitions.
Let us now define some properties of binary relations % over A. The first prop-
erty guarantees that preferences are complete orderings that can be represented by
continuous utility functions.
Property 1 (Regularity). The binary relation % satisfies:
a. Completeness. For all f, g ∈ A either f % g or g % f (or both).
b. Transitivity. For all f, g, h ∈ A, if f % g and g % h then f % h.
c. Archimedean. For all f, g, h ∈ A, if f  g and g  h then there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1)
such that αf + (1− α)h  g and g  βf + (1− β)h.
The second property is a dominance property that guarantees the consistency be-
tween preferences over acts and preferences over lotteries in each state of the world.
Property 2 (Monotonicity). For all f, g ∈ A, if f(s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S, then
f % g. If furthermore there exists t ∈ S such that f(t)  g(t), then f  g.
Note that we use a strong version of Monotonicity, which implies the sensitivity to
each state of the world. This also means that we rule out the existence of null states.
This is done for the sake of simplicity, to avoid some complications with dealing with
null states that would not change the message of the present note.
The last property is the VNM independence axiom restricted to risk situations
where probabilities are known.
4
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Property 3 (Risk independence). For all x, y, z ∈ X, if x % y, then for all
α ∈ [0, 1], x % y ⇐⇒ αx+ (1− α)z % αy + (1− α)z.
For any set Z, and function v : Z → R, we define Rg(v) = {a ∈ R : ∃z ∈ Z, a =
v(z)}. Let B be an interval in R, a monotonic function I : BS → R is normalized if
I(b, · · · , b) = b for all b ∈ B.
Definition 1. The binary relation % on A is a Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean
(MBA) preference ordering if there exist an affine function u : X → R and a continuous
increasing and normalized function I : Rg(u)→ R such that, for all f, g ∈ A,
f % g ⇐⇒ I
(
u
(
f(1)
)
, · · · , u(f(S))) ≥ I(u(g(1)), · · · , u(g(S))). (1)
Moreover, if v : X → R and Iv : Rg(v) → R also satisfy (1) and Iv is normalized,
then there exist λ ∈ R++ and µ ∈ R such that v(x) = λu(x) + µ for all x ∈ X and
Iv(b1, · · · , bS) = λI( b1−µλ , · · · , bS−µλ ) for all (b1, · · · , bS) ∈ Rg(v)S.
MBA preferences are characterized by the three properties introduced above.
Proposition 1 (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011). A binary relation % on A is an
MBA preference ordering if and only if it satisfies Regularity, Monotonicity and Risk
Independence.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011), the only
difference being that we only consider a finite number of states of the world, which are
all essential by Monotonicity, so that I is increasing.
MBA preferences encompass many decision models proposed in the literature on
choice under uncertainty. In particular it encompasses the SEU model.
Definition 2. A binary relation % on A is a subjective expected utility (SEU) pref-
erence ordering if there exists a vector (p1, · · · , pS) ∈ (0, 1)S with
∑
s∈S ps = 1 and an
affine function u : X → R such that, for all f, g ∈ A,
f % g ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
psu(f(s)) ≥
∑
s∈S
psu(g(s)). (2)
In the above definition, the vector (p1, · · · , pS) is the subjective probability distri-
bution used by the decision maker. When two decision makers have preferences that
5
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are SEU preference orderings, and when they have the same subjective probability
distribution, we say that they share the same beliefs.
3 The (im)possibility of consistent aggregations of MBA preferences
Let us now turn to the aggregation of preferences. We assume that all decision makers
(including society) have MBA preferences orderings %i, i ∈ N0. We also assume that
there exists some diversity among the individual preferences that we seek to aggregate.
It is represented by the following assumption that is known in the literature as the
‘independent prospects’ property (Weymark, 1991; Mongin, 1998).
Assumption 1. For any i ∈ N , there exists xi, yi ∈ X such that xi i yi and xi ∼j yi
for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
The aim of a social aggregation is to derive the social preference ordering from
individual preference orderings. Many ethical principles can be invoked to determine
how this aggregation should be made. But the most widely accepted principle is the
Pareto principle, whose strong version is as follows.
Axiom 1 (Strong Pareto). For all f, g ∈ A, if f %i g for all i ∈ N , then f %0 g. If
moreover there exists j ∈ N such that f j g, then f 0 g.
The following (im)possibility theorem, whose proof is in the Appendix, delineates
the scope of consistent preference aggregations.
Theorem 1. Assume that all individuals have MBA preferences satisfying Assumption
1. Social preferences can be MBA preferences and satisfy the Strong Pareto principle
only if all individuals have SEU preferences and share the same beliefs.
In that case, there exist weights (a1, · · · , aN ) ∈ RN+ such that, for all f, g ∈ A:
f %0 g ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
ps
(∑
i∈N
aiui
(
f(s)
)) ≥∑
s∈S
ps
(∑
i∈N
aiui
(
g(s)
))
, (3)
where (p1, · · · , pS) ∈ (0, 1)S is the individuals’ subjective probability distribution. Fur-
thermore the weight vector (a1, · · · , aN ) ∈ RN+ is unique, and the affine functions ui are
unique up to positive affine transformations with a common multiplier.
6
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The first part of Theorem 1 is an impossibility result. It states that it is impossible to
consistently aggregate preferences under uncertainty, unless individuals and the society
have SEU preferences and share the same beliefs. In particular, SEU preferences cannot
be aggregated when individuals have different beliefs (Mongin, 1995). And non-SEU
preferences cannot be aggregated even when people share the same beliefs (Gajdos,
Tallon and Vergnaud, 2008). Theorem 1 thus generalizes existing impossibility results.
The second part is the extension of Harsanyi’s results to the Anscombe-Aumann
framework when people are SEU and share the same beliefs. The social welfare function
must be an affine aggregation of individuals’ SEU. This specific aggregation has been
best described as generalized utilitarian (for clear and comprehensive reviews of the eth-
ical significance of Harsanyi’s theorem, see Weymark, 1991; Mongin and d’Aspremont,
1998). It may is problematic for societies wishing to incorporate fairness into their
decision making process.
As already noted by Diamond (1967), Harsanyi’s aggregation procedure prevents
ex ante equity considerations requiring progressive transfers of expected utility to be
welfare improving. Myerson (1981) also noted the difficulty of defining egalitarian
principles in risky situations. In the more general framework of dynamic choice under
uncertainty, Bommier and Zuber (2012) have already proved that rational Paretian
social observers must have the same aversion to inequality. Theorem 1 further specifies
this result by implying that inequality aversion is nil (with respect to specific normal-
izations of the expected utilities). Another issue is that of ex post equity. Fleurbaey
(2010) has proposed a specific weakening of the Pareto principle to deal with it.
4 Discussion
Theorem 1 states that it is generally impossible to consistently aggregate MBA indi-
vidual preferences into MBA social preferences. To escape the impossibility, several
directions can be explored.
An important condition for Theorem 1 to hold is Assumption 1. Of course, if the
assumption is true for some individuals in N only, the impossibility would still hold
(we only lose the uniqueness of the weights ai in Equation 3). To recover a possibility
result, we need to assume that all individuals have the same preferences on X. This
assumption was made by Cre`s, Gilboa and Vieille (2011). They showed that it is
then possible to aggregate agents beliefs in a consistent way within the multiple prior
7
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preference model. This finding is interesting but it seems restrictive to assume that
people have exactly the same risk preferences. The result is however useful if we focus
on the aggregation of preferences restricted to common-taste uncertain options (see
Danan et al., 2015).
Another option would be to widen the scope of admissible social preferences beyond
MBA preferences. An option that has widely been explored is to allow social prefer-
ences to be state-dependent. Within the SEU framework, Mongin (1998) obtained a
possibility result: although agents have different beliefs, it is possible to obtain a state
dependent SEU social ordering, which is an affine combination of agents ex ante ex-
pected utilities. Similar results have been presented by Chambers and Hayashi (2006).
However, allowing for state dependence at the social level cannot restore the possibility
for non-SEU preferences (see Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud, 2008; Mongin and Pivato,
2015). The results of the present note could be extended to allow state dependence,
without modifying the result. Another possibility would be to completely drop the
requirement of Monotonicity (or statewise dominance). This is actually what was sug-
gested by the literature promoting ex ante equity in the context of risk and uncertainty
(see for instance Diamond, 1967; Epstein and Segal, 1992), but one then has to deal
with the issue of time consistency (Machina, 1989).
A last option to restore possibilities would be to weaken the Pareto principle. A
first direction would be to only use the Weak Pareto principle. This would make pos-
sible dictatorial choices, where the society always makes decision using the preference
ordering of a specific individual. Positional dictatorships (such as Maxmin) are however
not possible in general (see Chambers and Hayashi, 2014). Other weakened versions
of the Pareto principle have been proposed. To avoid spurious unanimities Gilboa,
Samet and Schmeidler (2004) proposed to restrict the use of the Pareto principle to
cases where SEU agents have the same beliefs. Danan et al. (2015) have recently shown
that this not enough if we want to study MBA preferences: even with identical sets
of belief, agents may agree to prefer situations which are socially dominated in each
state of the world. Danan et al. (2015) hence further restricted the Pareto principle
to apply to common-taste outcomes (they call this principle the common-taste robust
Pareto principle). Brunnermeier et al. (2014) proposed a similar version of the Pareto
principle. Gilboa, Samuelson and Schmeidler (2014) proposed a stronger notion of no-
betting Pareto dominance. This route is thus a promising avenue for research. One
8
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limitation, though, is that affine aggregations of utilities are in general still obtained
(see for instance Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler, 2004; Danan et al., 2015). Fairness
issues, such as those discussed Section 3, remain unresolved by the use of such weakened
Pareto principles.
Appendix
Assume that all agents have MBA preferences on A, and that social preferences are
also MBA. By Proposition 1, for any i ∈ N0 there exist an affine function ui : X → R
and a continuous increasing and normalized function Ii : Rg(ui)→ R such that, for all
f, g ∈ A,
f %i g ⇐⇒ Ii
(
ui
(
f(1)
)
, · · · , ui
(
f(S)
)) ≥ I(ui(g(1)), · · · , ui(g(S))). (4)
The following Lemma concerns the aggregation in risky situations.
Lemma 1. There exist unique weights (a1, · · · , aN ) ∈ RN++ and a constant b ∈ R such
that, for all x ∈ X:
u0(x) =
∑
i∈N
aiui(x) + b, (5)
Proof. Applying the Strong Pareto principle to preferences restricted to X, this follows
from the results by Fishburn (1984, Theorem 2 and Corollary 1).
Define U = {(v1, · · · , vN ) ∈ RN | ∃x ∈ X : vi = ui(x),∀i ∈ N}. The set U is a
nonempty convex subspace of RN of dimension N .2 Hence US is also a nonempty convex
subspace of RN×S of dimension NS. A vector v ∈ US has coordinates vsi , meaning that
there exists f ∈ A such that, for any i ∈ N and any s ∈ S, vsi = ui
(
f(s)
)
.
For all i ∈ N , we now define the relations %∗i over US in the following way. For any
v, v˜ ∈ US and any f, g ∈ A such that vsi = ui
(
f(s)
)
and vsi = ui
(
f(s)
)
for all i ∈ N
and s ∈ S:
v %∗i v˜ ⇐⇒ f %i g. (6)
2Indeed, if v = (v1, · · · , vn) ∈ U and v˜ = (v˜1, · · · , v˜n) ∈ U , this implies that there exist x, y ∈ X
such that vi = ui(x) and v˜i = ui(y),∀i ∈ N . For any λ ∈ (0, 1), let z = λx + (1 − λy). Then, for all
i ∈ N , ui(z) = λui(x)+(1−λ)ui(y) = λvi+(1−λ)v˜i. Hence, λv+(1−λ)v˜ ∈ U . Assumption 1 implies
that the dimension of U is N , because all components are independent.
9
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Hence, using Equation (4), for all i ∈ N and all v, v˜ ∈ US , v %∗i v˜ ⇐⇒ Ii
(
v1i , · · · , vSi
)
≥
Ii
(
v˜1i , · · · , v˜Si
)
. By Lemma 1, it must also be the case that, for all v, v˜ ∈ US ,
v %∗0 v˜ ⇐⇒ I0
(∑
i∈N
aiv
1
i +b, · · · ,
∑
i∈N
aiv
S
i +b
) ≥ I0(∑
i∈N
aiv˜
1
i +b, · · · ,
∑
i∈N
aiv˜
S
i +b
)
(7)
The following Lemma lists some properties of relation %∗0.
Lemma 2. The relation %∗0 on US is complete, transitive, continuous and all indiffer-
ence sets of %∗0 are connected subsets of US.
Proof. That %∗0 is complete, transitive and continuous is proved by the fact that it is
represented on US by a continuous real-valued function (Equation 7).
Consider any v, v˜ ∈ US such that v ∼∗0 v˜. Denote S¯ =
{
s ∈ S|∑i∈N aivsi >∑
i∈N aiv˜
s
i
}
and S =
{
s ∈ S|∑i∈N aivsi < ∑i∈N aiv˜si }. For any λ, µ ∈ [0, 1], also
denote µλv the vector such that
(a) µλv
s
i = λv
i
s + (1− λ)v˜is for all i ∈ N and s ∈ (S \ S),
(b) and µλv
s
i = µv˜
i
s + (1− µ)vis for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S.
By convexity of U , we know that µλv ∈ US for any λ, µ ∈ [0, 1].
Case 1: S¯ = S = ∅. In that case, v ∼∗0 λλv ∼∗0 v˜ for any λ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence the map
ψ : [0, 1] → US such that ψ(λ) = λλv for all λ ∈ [0, 1] defines a path between v and
v˜ whose elements are on the same indifference curve as v and v˜. The segment of the
indifference curve between v and v˜ is path connected.
Case 2: S¯ = ∅ and S 6= ∅ or S¯ 6= ∅ and S = ∅. This is impossible: because I0 is
increasing, this would imply either v ≺ v˜ or v  v˜, which is a contradiction.
Case 3: S¯ 6= ∅ and S 6= ∅. For λ ∈ (0, 1), we have 0λv ≺∗0 v ∼∗0 v˜ ≺∗0 1λv.3 the map
Ψ : [0, 1]→ US such that Ψ(µ) = µλv for all µ ∈ [0, 1] defines a path between 0λv and 1λv.
Given that %∗0 is continuous, there exist µ ∈ (0, 1) such that µλv ∼∗0 v ∼∗0 v˜. We denote
µ(λ) this number, which is unique.4 We also take µ(0) = 1 and µ(1) = 0. Hence the
map ψ : [0, 1] → US such that ψ(λ) = µ(λ)λ v for all λ ∈ [0, 1] defines a path between v
3Indeed, by definition, for all s ∈ S¯, ∑i∈N aivsi > λ (∑i∈N aivsi ) + (1 − λ) (∑i∈N aiv˜si ) =∑
i∈N ai
0
λv
s
i ; in the meantime,
∑
i∈N aiv
s
i =
∑
i∈N ai
0
λv
s
i for all s ∈ (S \ S¯). Similarly, for
all s ∈ S¯, ∑i∈N aiv˜si < λ (∑i∈N aivsi ) + (1 − λ) (∑i∈N aiv˜si ) = ∑i∈N ai 1λvsi ; in the meantime,∑
i∈N aiv˜
s
i =
∑
i∈N ai
1
λv
s
i for all s ∈ (S \ S¯). The results thus hold because I0 is increasing.
4Indeed, we have
∑
i∈N ai
µ
λv
s
i = λ
(∑
i∈N aiv
s
i
)
+(1−λ) (∑i∈N aiv˜si ) for all µ ∈ [0, 1] and s ∈ (S\S).
10
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and v˜ whose elements are on the same indifference curve as v and v˜. The segment of
the indifference curve between v and v˜ is path connected.
All indifference sets of %∗0 are path-connected and thus connected.
The function Vi : US → R defined by Vi(v) = Ii(v1i , · · · , vSi ) for all v ∈ US is a
representation of %∗i for each i ∈ N . The function V0 : US → R defined by V0(v) =
I0
(∑
i∈N aiu
1
i + b, · · · ,
∑
i∈N aiu
S
i
)
+ b
)
for all v ∈ US is a representation of %∗0. The
Strong Pareto principle and the definition of %∗i also imply that:
(P*) For all v, v˜ ∈ US , if v %∗i vˆ for all i ∈ N , then v %∗0 vˆ. If moreover there exists
j ∈ N such that v ∗j vˆ, then v ∗0 vˆ.
We have the following Lemma:
Lemma 3. Let B =
{
(b1, · · · , bN ) ∈ RN | ∃v ∈ US : bi = Vi(v) for all i ∈ N
}
. There
exists a continuous and increasing function W : K → R such that for all f ∈ A:
V0(f) = W
(
V1(f), · · · , VN (f)
)
. (8)
Proof. Under Pareto Indifference (which is implied for preferences over US by property
P*), Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1999, Lemma 1, p. 369; Lemma 2, p.370)
showed that there must exist a continuous social aggregator function W . Condition P*
further entails that W must be increasing in each of its components.
By definition of the Vi functions, using Equation (8), and denoting, for each s ∈
S, ws : U → R the function such that ws(vs1, · · · , vsN ) =
∑
i∈N aiv
s
i + b for any
(vs1, · · · , vsN ) ∈ U , the following equation holds for any v ∈ US :
W
(
I1
(
v11, · · · , vS1
)
, · · · , IN
(
v1N , · · · , vSN
))
= I0
(
w1(v
1
1, · · · , v1N ), · · · , wS(vS1 , · · · , vSN )
)
.
(9)
Consider any open box K in RN×S which is a subspace of US . The functional
equation (9) holds for any vector in K. Given that the functions I0, W , w and Ii are
And, for all s ∈ S: ∑
i∈N
ai
µ
λv
s
i >
∑
i∈N
ai
µˆ
λv
s
i ⇐⇒ µ < µˆ.
The only possibility to have µλv ∼∗0 µˆλv is that µ = µˆ.
11
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.69
all continuous and increasing, the solution of the functional equation is (see Acze´l and
Maksa, 1996, Theorem 5):
I0(w1, · · · , wS) = Φ
(∑
s∈S
ψs(ws)
)
(10)
W (I1, · · · , IN ) = Φ
(∑
i∈N
φi(Ii)
)
(11)
∀s ∈ S, ws(vs1, · · · , vsN ) = ψ−1s
(∑
i∈N
ϕsi (v
s
i )
)
(12)
∀i ∈ N , Ii(v1i , · · · , vSi ) = φ−1i
(∑
s∈S
ϕsi (v
s
i )
)
(13)
where the real functions Φ, ψs, φi, ϕ
s
i are continuous and increasing.
But we also know that, for any s ∈ S and (vs1, · · · , vsN ) ∈ U , ws(vs1, · · · , vsN ) =∑
i∈N aiv
s
i +b. Combining with Equation (12), we obtain the following Pexider equation
on a rectangular non-empty subset of U :
∑
i∈N
ϕsi (v
s
i ) = ψs
(∑
i∈N
aiv
s
i + b
)
.
Thus there must exist a positive number pis and real numbers κ
s
i such that ψs(z) =
pisz+
(∑
i∈N κ
s
i −pisb
)
and ϕsi (v
s
i ) = pisaiv
s
i +κ
s
i , for all i ∈ N , on the relevant domain
(see Ra´do and Baker, 1987, Theorem 1 and Corollary 3).
Let int(US) be the interior of the set US . For any v ∈ int(US), it is possible to
construct an open box K(v) in RN×S around v, which is a subspace of US . On K(v),
%∗0 is locally represented by the fully additive representation:
W (v) = Φ
(∑
i∈N
∑
s∈S
pisaiv
i
s +
∑
i∈N
∑
s∈S
κsi
)
.
But, since int(US) is convex and %∗0-indifference connected (Lemma 2), we know by
Theorem 2.2 of Chateauneuf and Wakker (1993) that this local fully additive repre-
sentation extends globally to the whole set int(US). Furthermore, this global additive
representation is unique up to a positive affine transformation. This implies that the
weight vectors (p1, · · · , pS) ∈ (0, 1)S and (a1, · · · , aN ) ∈ RN+ are uniquely defined. Last,
12
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since US is convex and %∗0 is continuous, the representation also extends to the bound-
aries of US .
Combining Equations (13), that ϕsi (v
s
i ) = pisaiv
s
i + κ
s
i on the relevant domain, and
the fact that Ii is normalized, we obtained that, for any (v
1
i , · · · , vSi ) ∈ RS such that
there exists f ∈ A for which ui
(
f(s)
)
= vsi :
Ii(v
1
i , · · · , vSi ) =
∑
s∈S
pis∑
s∈S pis
vsi .
Denote ps =
pis∑
s∈S pis
for all s ∈ S. The vector (p1, · · · , pS) ∈ (0, 1)S uniquely defines
a probability distribution over states of the world. And, because individuals have MBA
preferences, we obtain that for all i ∈ N and f, g ∈ A:
f %i g ⇐⇒ Ii
(
ui
(
f(1)
)
, · · · , ui
(
f(S)
)) ≥ Ii(ui(g(1)), · · · , ui(g(S)))
⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
psui
(
f(s)
) ≥∑
s∈S
psui
(
g(s)
)
.
By Definition 2 the individuals must therefore have SEU preferences and use the same
subjective probability distribution (p1, · · · , pS).
Combining Equations (10) and (12), and using ϕsi (v
s
i ) = pisaiv
s
i +κ
s
i on the relevant
domain and that I0 is normalized, we also get that, for any v ∈ US :
I0
(
w1(v
1
1, · · · , v1N ), · · · , wS(vS1 , · · · , vSN )
)
=
∑
s∈S
ps
(∑
i∈N
aiv
s
i + b
)
.
Using the definition of %∗0, we have that for any f, g ∈ A:
f %0 g ⇐⇒ I0
(
w1
(
u1
(
f(1)
)
, · · · , uN
(
f(1)
))
, · · · , wS
(
u1
(
f(S)
)
, · · · , uN
(
f(S)
)))
≥ I0
(
w1
(
u1
(
g(1)
)
, · · · , uN
(
g(1)
))
, · · · , wS
(
u1
(
g(S)
)
, · · · , uN
(
g(S)
)))
⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
ps
(∑
i∈N
aiui
(
f(s)
)) ≥∑
s∈S
ps
(∑
i∈N
aiui
(
g(s)
))
.
The uniqueness of the global additive representation of % up to a positive affine
transformation implies that the affine functions ui must be unique up to positive affine
transformations with a common multiplier.
13
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